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Evidence suggests that subjective and objective anomalies associated with ghostly 
episodes form a unidimensional Rasch scale and that these interconnected “signs or 
symptoms” arguably describe a syndrome model. This view predicts that symptom 
perception—that is, the phenomenology of these anomalous episodes—can be markedly 
skewed by an experient’s psychological set. This is impacted, in turn, by psychosocial 
variables that affect attentional, perceptual, and interpretational processes. Therefore, we 
present an overview that discusses how (a) Belief in the Paranormal, (b) Religious 
Ideology, (c) Ideological Practice, (d) Social Desirability, (e) Latency, and (f) Environ- 
mental Setting ostensibly influence the contents or interpretations of accounts. These 
experiential details are similarly expected to reveal insights into the psychodynamics 
being expressed or contextualized via these narratives. Future research in this area should 
help to validate and clarify the proposed syndrome model, as well as explore which 
nuances in the phenomenology of ghostly episodes reflect idiosyncrasies of experients’ 
psychological set versus the nature of the core phenomenon itself. 




We agree with Bauer’s (2004, p. 645) senti- 
ment that the public deserves an accurately 
informed response when scientists are posed 
questions such as, “What’s going on when peo- 
ple report ghosts and haunted houses?” This 
issue is not trivial, as surveys show that we are 
dealing with an ongoing and widespread behav- 
ioral phenomenon (e.g., Chapman University, 
2018; Haraldsson, 2011; McClenon, 2012; 
Murray & Jones, 2012; Rice, 2003; Ross & 
Joshi, 1992; YouGov, 2019). Moreover, these 
narratives—as religio-cultural beliefs, shared 
stories, or putative experiences—often affect 
people in profound and even transformative 
ways (Drinkwater et al., 2019; Hill et al., 
2018, 2019). For instance, some academic re- 
searchers have boldly professed that spontane- 
ous cases can be so impressive prima facie that 
they serve as indisputable evidence of the para- 
normal (e.g., Stokes, 2017a, 2017b). Other 
times individuals can endure unexpected con- 
sequences of these anomalous experiences that 
disrupt their normal functioning. 
There are many psychosocial and clinical fa- 
cets to ghostly perceptions, so we take these 
anomalous experiences seriously but not neces- 
   sarily at face value (Houran, 2017; Houran et al., 
2017). When misunderstood, these experiences 
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can fundamentally contribute to misdiagnosis 
due to arcane content that often resembles posi- 
tive symptoms in schizophrenia or schizotypal 
personality disorder. In fact, Raybeyron and 






specifically to deal with these “paranormal” en- 
counters. Haunt-type experiences, absent of any 
other psychosis criteria, can pose interventional 
challenges to clinicians who lack a working 
knowledge of anomalistic psychology, parapsy- 
chology, and unusual or religio-cultural beliefs or 
practices that often reference spectral phenomena 
(e.g., Ali et al., 2004; Bilu & Witztum, 1994; 
Bowie, 2017; Cooper et al., 2015; Fach et al., 
2013; Grover et al., 2014; Hsu & Wang, 2011; 
Koltko, 1990; Koss-Chioino, 2003; Martin, 
2020; Moreira-Almeida & Cardeña, 2011). 
To be sure, questions about the nature of 
“ghosts, poltergeists, and haunted houses” (col- 
lectively termed ghostly episodes) have long been 
debated within academia (for overviews, see 
Baker, 2002; Gauld & Cornell, 2007; Houran 
& Lange, 2001a; Maher, 2015; Massullo, 2017; 
McCue, 2002; O’Keeffe & Parsons, 2010; Roll, 
1977). In part, this is because (a) the literature 
has lacked standard operationalizations of the 
phenomena in question and (b) there is difficulty 
teasing apart subjective from objective aspects 
in percipients’ accounts. Particularly, Objective 
(O, or external) anomalies, such as measurable 
temperature changes, raps and knockings, elec- 
trical disturbances, malfunctioning equipment, 
and apparent object movements, would seem 
clearly differentiated from Subjective (S, or psy- 
chological) events that tend to be experienced by 
singular observers via their senses or otherwise 
explainable as overactive imaginations, percep- 
tual aberrations, or psychosomatic symptoms, for 
example, apparitions, sensed presences, or 
unusual bodily sensations. 
However, S/O facets to these occurrences 
appear more “entangled” than previously thought. 
Specifically, these two classes of experience can 
be Rasch (1980) scaled together as a robust, 
unidimensional construct (Houran & Lange, 
2001b; Houran et al., 2019, 2002). This result 
from advanced psychometric analysis therefore 
suggests that ghostly episodes fundamentally 
are behavioral expressions of embodied and struc- 
tured narratives. Moreover, it can be argued that 
these seemingly disparate but interconnected set of 
perceptions define a core “syndrome” (Houran 
et al., 2019a, 2019b). This term denotes a “ : : :  
recognizable complex of symptoms and physical 
findings which indicate a specific condition for 
which a direct cause is not necessarily understood” 
(Calvo et al., 2003, p. 802; cf. British Medical 
Association, 2018). 
The Present Overview 
O’Keeffe et al. (2019) referred to recurrent 
anomalous experiences in the present context 
as Haunted People Syndrome (HP-S; cf. Lange 
et al., 2020). The syndrome rubric is intended 
here as a descriptor of its associated phenome- 
nology as opposed to an indicator of an implicit 
medical condition or diseased state. Some authors 
have further argued that this apparent core syn- 
drome—sometimes called “(entity) encounter 
experiences” (Parra, 2018; Kumar & Pekala, 
2001; Winkelman, 2018)—alters its appearance 
(Evans, 1987; Houran, 2000; Hufford, 1982) or 
meaning (Drinkwater et al., 2013; Dyne, 2010; 
Puhle, 2001) according to the situational or socio- 
cultural context in which it manifests. 
Similarly, a syndrome model implies the like- 
lihood of nuances or idiosyncrasies in the phe- 
nomenology (or symptom perception) due to 
variations that depend both on how researchers 
classify percipients into demographic groups, 
and on psychological variables that differentiate 
a particular percipient from others. This asser- 
tion follows from corresponding effects docu- 
mented in the biomedical literature on the 
epidemiology of phenomena such as depres- 
sive-type episodes (Lange et al., 2002), idio- 
pathic environmental intolerance (Skovbjerg 
et al., 2009), and general mental health (Kim 
& Kim, 2017). There is also ample literature that 
demonstrates the need for acknowledging and 
incorporating into clinical practice the social, 
ethnic, and racial belief systems of clients 
(Rogler et al., 1987). Of course, this likewise 
includes the role of religious beliefs (Carlson 
et al., 2002; C. Cooper, 2012; Crossley & Salter, 
2005; Ellis, 2000; Meer & Mir, 2014; Pearce 
et al., 2015). 
Ghostly episodes can be challenging to address 
in clinical settings, because they comprise an 
“etiologically complex” series of experiences 
and ideologically-driven interpretations that 
influence the meaning and justification for cli- 
ents’ cognitions and behaviors. Accordingly, we 
review pertinent literature that expands on 
Houran et al.’s (2019a, 2019b) conceptual and 
empirical work on the syndrome model for 
ghostly episodes. We specifically discuss key 
biopsychosocial variables that influence impor- 
tant aspects of their phenomenology. In this way, 
we aim to provide: (a) a synopsis of evidence- 
based variables that likely contextualize the 
 
 
contents and interpretations of these anomalous 
experiences and (b) data-driven considerations 
for educational or therapeutic interventions with 
percipients who seek a deeper understanding of 
their experiences. 
 
A Foundational Model Based on 
Transliminality 
Previous authors have described ghostly epi- 
sodes as a phenomenon rooted in environment- 
person interactions (or enactive processes) (e.g., 
Childs & Murray, 2010; Drinkwater et al., 2019; 
Eaton, 2019; Hill et al., 2018, 2019; Lange & 
Houran, 2001). However, direct empirical evi- 
dence for this idea was perhaps offered first by 
Houran and Lange (2009, pp. 96–97) who found 
that certain anomalies in the Rasch hierarchy of 
haunt experiences from an earlier field study of a 
reputed haunt (Houran, Wiseman et al., 2002) 
were either significantly under-reported or over- 
reported based on respondents’ gender and ques- 
tionnaire levels of transliminality. In other words, 
the mental boundary structures of experients seem- 
inglymediatedsystematicshiftsoralterationsinthe 
overall structure and contents of their ghost 
narratives. 
By way of explanation, transliminality 
concep- tually and empirically parallels 
Hartmann’s (1991) popular notion of mental 
boundary functioning (see e.g., Houran et al., 
2003; Lange, Houran et al., 2019; Thalbourne 
& Maltby, 2008). It also resembles (and 
predates) the concept of “sensory processing 
sensitivity” (Aron & Aron, 1997; Greven et al., 
2019). However, transliminality spe- cifically 
draws on Herbart’s (1824/1961) activation theory 
of consciousness and therefore is tradition- ally 
defined as the “hypothesized tendency for 
psychological material to cross (trans) thresholds 
(limines) into or out of consciousness” (Thalbourne 
& Houran, 2000, p. 853). Thalbourne and Maltby 
(2008) later modified this description to “a hyper- 
sensitivity to psychological material originating in 
(a) the unconscious and/or (b) the external 
environment” (p. 1618). This emphasizes that 
high-transliminals might be more prone to what 
Michael Jawer (2006, 2020) regards as “sensitivi- 
ties” to a range of stimuli—emotional, environ- 
mental, chemical, electrical, and potentially 
parapsychological. 
Of course, this also implies a greater susceptibil- 
ity to “dis-ease” states (i.e., the natural state of 
“ease” being disrupted or imbalanced) that 
seemingly coincide with many haunt-related 
experiences such as bereavement apparitions 
(Castelnovo et al., 2015; Persinger, 1993), after- 
death communications (C. E. Cooper, 2012; 
Steffen & Coyle, 2012), and “poltergeist” distur- 
bances (Roll, 1977; Ventola et al., 2019). Illustra- 
tively, Raybeyron and Loose (2015) reported that 
upto 10% ofthegeneralpopulationareestimatedto 
have “hallucinatory” encounter experiences with- 
out any diagnostic features of psychosis. They 
further argued that negative life events and 
permeable boundary structures were better corre- 
lated to encounter experiences than was psychosis. 
Authors of published studies often cite the 
original definition, but the transliminality con- 
struct has been further refined in terms of state 
or trait neuroplasticity — referring here to en- 
hanced, and perhaps adaptive, interconnectedness 
between brain hemispheres, as well as among 
frontal cortical loops, temporal-limbic structures, 
and primary or secondary sensory areas or sensory 
association cortices (Thalbourne et al., 2001, 
2003; Thalbourne & Maltby, 2008). This more 
detailed description and the related hypothesis is 
supported by numerous studies showing that 
scores on the Revised Transliminality Scale 
(Lange et al., 2000) consistently and positively 
correlate with measures of syncretic cognitions, or 
the dedifferentiation (or fusion) of perceptual 
qualities in subjective experience (for reviews, 
see Evans et al., 2019; Houran et al., 2006; 
Lange et al., 2000, 2019). Chief examples of these 
cognitions include eidetic imagery (fusion of 
imagery and perception, i.e., structural eidetic 
imagery); physiognomic perception (fusion of 
perception and feeling); and synesthesia (fusion 
of              sensory               modalities). 
Building on this literature, Laythe et  al. (2018) 
studied a host of cognitive and affective variables 
used in the literature to profile “haunters” but only 
transliminality replicated as a clear and robust 
predictor of the onset and features of self-reported 
ghostly experiences. Other researchers have sim- 
ilarly found positive correlations between trans- 
liminality (or alternative measures of permeable 
boundaries) and self-reported encounter experi- 
ences (Houran, et al., 2003, 2002; Jawer, 2006; 
Kumar & Pekala, 2001; Laythe et al., 2017; Parra, 
2018). Accordingly, a transliminal model implies 
that ghostly episodes are associated with a par- 




least partly, hypersensitivities to and amalgams 
of internally- and externally- generated stimuli. 
Ventola et al.’s (2019) follow-up review of 
empirical literature on the psychology of apparent 
“focus persons” in poltergeist cases (i.e., so-
called “recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis: 
RSPK” that manifests in the presence of a specific 
personor persons) alsosuggestedasimilar effect of 
transliminality. These collective patterns are 
consistent with an interactionist (or enactive) phe- 
nomenon,wherebyghostlyepisodesinvolve(a) the 
right people in the right environments (or condi- 
tions) (e.g., Laythe et al., 2018) and (b) the added 
influenceofanindividual’spsychologicalsetonthe 
attentionalandperceptualprocessesthatmediateor 
dictate the phenomenology of the core syndrome 
(e.g., Houran, Wiseman et al., 2002). 
 
Additional Influences on Psychological 
Set and Concomitant Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is the study of the structures of 
experience and consciousness (see e.g., Seamon, 
2000), which we propose has macro and micro 
aspects. Macro-phenomenology can be said to 
reference conditions that determine whether an 
experience (or syndrome) will manifest, whereas 
micro-phenomenology involves the particular 
contents or details of an experience (or syndrome) 
as it unfolds. These nuances are readily exempli- 
fied by curious paradoxes long noted in haunt 
cases and encounter experiences, such as why 
some people have experiences while others who 
are present do not (i.e., macro-phenomenology, 
e.g., Cornell, 2002; Roll, 1977) or why multiple 
witnesses can perceive shared experiences differ- 
ently (i.e., micro-phenomenology, e.g., Jaki, 
1999; McHarg, 1973). 
Building on our transliminal model (Laythe 
et al., 2018; Ventola et al., 2019), we expect 
that the macro- and micro-phenomenology of 
ghostly episodes are further altered by six key 
variables: (a) Belief in the Paranormal, (b) Reli- 
gious Ideology, (c) Ideological Practice, (d) 
Social Desirability, (e) Latency, and (f) Environ- 
mental Setting. Undoubtedly many other state or 
trait factors could also come into play, but we 
emphasize these particular variables given ample 
rationale and evidence to support their inclusion 
in this overview. Furthermore, each variable can 
be measured empirically with existing instru- 
ments for use in research and clinical contexts. 
To begin, Paranormal Belief (PB) is a common 
culprit identified across content analyses of spon- 
taneous cases (Harte, 2000; Houran, 2000), sur- 
vey studies (Houran et al., 2002; Kumar & 
Pekala, 2001; Lange & Houran, 1998, 1999, 
2000; Laythe et al., 2018; Laythe & Owen, 
2012), laboratory-based evaluations (Dagnall 
et al., 2015; Irwin, 2015; Ventola & Terhune, 
2009), and field settings (Houran, 2002; Houran, 
Wiseman et al., 2002; Wiseman et al., 2002). 
Moreover, we note that Laythe et al. (2018) 
also found significant correlations between the 
onset or features of haunt-type experiences and 
the New Age Philosophy variety of PB. 
Similarly, Religious Ideology and Ideological 
Practice are expected to further alter the struc- 
ture or content of ghostly experiences, as con- 
sidered from a social identity perspective (Hill 
et al., 2018, 2019; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), or 
the broader domain of social reality drawing 
from sociology and social psychology 
(Buchanan & Hughes, 2009; Jussim, 1991; 
Klein & Goethals, 2002). Indeed, one of the 
more robust findings in Social Identity Theory 
and the psychology of religion is that the stron- 
ger an individual adheres to a philosophical or 
religious ideology, the more likely the person’s 
perspective and preferences will gravitate 
towards explanations in life that align to this 
attendant belief system (e.g., self-serving 
biases: Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). 
From an ontological perspective, ideals define 
our nature of reality precisely because our 
psyches treat ideals as if they were tangibly 
real, and our actions reflect those ideals in 
measurable behaviors. This is essentially the 
heart of the well-substantiated Thomas Theorem 
(Merton, 1995)—that which is perceived as real 
will be real in its consequences. Sociocultural 
analyses demonstrate that ghostly episodes are no 
exception to these tenets (Drinkwater et al., 2019; 
Hill et al., 2018, 2019; Houran et al., 2020). Part 
of basic human psychology lies in confirming 
personal beliefs and predictions of the world to 
provide control (Langer & Rodin, 1976), which to 
some extent, maintains one’s self-esteem or 
well-being (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Part of assessing a strong identity reliance 
(i.e., “identity fusion,” Swann et al., 2009) is 
gauging the degree to which individuals routinely 
fit information within their chosen identity’s 
schemas. This concept of identity fusion is not 
new, but again echoes what Jung referred to as 
 
 
the persona, noting that over-reliance on an iden- 
tity can lessen other aspects of the person 
(Jung, 1951). Further, identity fusion (Swann & 
Buhrmester, 2015; Swann et al., 2009, 2012) 
arguably predicts that uses of other social identities 
in the person would lessen (i.e., Self-Categorization 
Theory; Turner & Reynolds, 2012), or a heavily- 
relied upon identity tied into family-like relations or 
self-identification would become overly “salient” 
across multiple environments and situations. 
Extreme examples are found in research on religion, 
whereby people high in religious fundamentalism 
exhibit biases in the type of literature to which they 
are willing to be exposed (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 
1983; Hunsberger et al., 1994, 1996). 
An adopted ideology, in turn, contributes to 
the ubiquitous effects of confirmation bias, 
(Hergovich et al., 2010; Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
Nickerson, 1998; Palmer et al., 2012), belief 
perseverance (Ross & Anderson, 1982; Ross 
et al., 1975) or in multiple witness accounts, 
psychological contagion effects (e.g., Houran & 
Lange, 1996; Lorber et al., 2007). We emphasize 
here that “evidence and fact” in ideology is, at best, 
tertiary towards its use, and the term “ideology” 
should not be limited to spiritual or religious 
beliefs. Clinicians regularly confront belief 
systems—political, empirical, or cultural—that 
encompass unproved or assumed tenets that are 
dogmatic or contradictory. 
These belief systems drive meaning in people’s 
lives. In essence, data is not interpretation, which 
is always speculative to some degree. Thus, 
personal beliefs, and particularly those regarding 
religio-spiritual issues, seem to shape both the 
interpretation and meaning of ghostly experi- 
ences (Drinkwater et al., 2013, 2017; Dyne, 
2010; Hufford, 1982; McClenon, 2002). In 
fact, previous work by Bader et al. (2012) sug- 
gested that religious belief and paranormal belief 
have a curvilinear relationship as a function of 
organized religion sanctioning some paranormal 
experiences and not others. Therefore, the struc- 
ture or content of accounts might differ in accor- 
dance with the strength and commonly accepted 
explanations within an individual’s ideology. 
Another obvious mediator of perceptions or 
reports might be Social Desirability (or impres- 
sion management), which is a response bias that 
reflects the tendency for individuals to answer 
questions in a manner that will be viewed favor- 
ably by others. It can take the form of over- 
reporting “good behavior” or under-reporting 
“bad,” or undesirable behavior. This tendency 
can pose serious problems when conducting 
research with self-reports, especially question- 
naires as used here that pertain to unusual, atypi- 
cal, or “unlikely” experiences, or in response to 
demand characteristics (Merckelbach et al., 
2017). Problematic in this regard is that what is 
deemed “good or bad” is a function of the major- 
ity belief system in which the percipient is 
engaged. A person in a “pro-paranormal” setting 
is encouraged towards one set of explanations, 
while the “anti-paranormal” is encouraged 
towards other sets of explanations. In both cases 
ostracism or punishment is likely (i.e., outgroup 
prejudice) if events are not interpreted with the 
“status quo” (for empirical examples, see: 
Brewer, 2007; Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014). 
For instance, research indicates that percipients 
are often aware that their anomalous experiences 
are unconventional and therefore they sometimes 
rationalize them with orthodox beliefs when dis- 
cussing them publicly (Drinkwater et al., 2013; 
Schmied-Knittel & Schetsche, 2005) or other- 
wise “mould” their accounts in the face of overt 
skepticism (Ohashi et al., 2013). Accordingly, 
social desirability or related social forces and 
pressures can distort experiences or accounts 
related to ghosts. However, we therefore refer 
interested readers to Drinkwater et al.’s (2019) 
discussion of the roles of conformity and “ga- 
slighting” effects in ghost narratives. From a 
clinical perspective, HP-S is problematic when 
the experiences create emotional angst for the 
client in terms of their content or consequences. 
The potential fear of judgment and ridicule may 
inhibit clients from sharing the actual causes of 
what might be contributing to their distress, lead- 
ing to misattributed etiology of a client’s 
symptomology. 
Finally, there are the potential influences of 
Time or Place. Particularly, some studies suggest 
that recollections of anomalous experiences (e.g., 
near-death experiences) are not significantly em- 
bellished over time (Alvarado & Zingrone, 1997; 
Lester, 2003), whereas other research has docu- 
mented Latency effects (Lange et al., 2004). 
We are unaware of any studies on this issue as 
applied to ghostly episodes, so it remains an open 
and important question. Moreover, we have 
previously speculated (Houran & Brugger, 2000; 
Houran et al., 2019b) that Rasch (1980) hierarchies 
of anomalies are possibly idiosyncratic to specific 




cases (see e.g., Evans, 1987; Gauld & Cornell, 
2007; Tyrrell, 1973). There are indeed hints that 
the physical and psychological setting of an episode 
can predict important aspects of the phenomenology 
of percipients’ experiences. Specifically, Houran 
et al. (2019b) found that the micro-phenome- 
nology of reports shifted in systematic ways 
depending on whether the ghost narratives 
derived from “spontaneous” (i.e., sincere and 
unprimed) circumstances or those associated 
with primed conditions, fantasy scenarios, or 
deliberate fabrication. 
We further posit that the “setting” itself is a 
biopsychosocial construct involving: (a) Location, 
for example, naturalistic (or external) environs 
versus built (or internal) structures; (b) Spontane- 
ity, that is, whether an experience is genuinely 
unplanned or deliberately cultivated; (c) Proximity, 
for example, the relation of S/O anomalies to an 
experient’s personal space; (d) Gestalt-type in- 
fluences, for example, affordance, atmosphere, 
ambiguity-threat anticipatory processes, immer- 
sion and presence, legibility, and percipient mem- 
ory and associations; and (e) Social Density, for 
example, research has shown unquestionably that 
peripheral cues (i.e., environmental, group, and 
non-argument related variables) will strongly and 
significantly affect persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). “Haunted houses” have been studied and 
discussed from the perspectives of environmental 
psychology and architectural phenomenology (for 
reviews, see: Dagnall et al., 2020; Jawer et al., 
2020), but this research is in its infancy and mainly 
exploratory in nature. Thus, the specific impacts of 
“time or place” on ghostly episodes is a rich area for 
further study and observation. 
 
Sociocultural Influences and the 
VAPUS Model 
A distinct psychological set also can be influ- 
enced by broad sociocultural variables. We can 
draw on the proposed VAPUS model for ghost 
narratives (Hill et al., 2018, 2019) to under- 
stand and describe the role of broader cognitive- 
affective factors in shaping the report or recall 
of S/O anomalies that define our hypothesized 
syndrome model. Particularly, this framework 
echoes systems theory (i.e., a biopsychosocial 
or enactive approach) to specify people’s 
interactions with their environments and how 
these activities reinforce mechanisms that 
inform the perception of experiences or events 
as paranormal, that is, a percipient’s psycho- 
logical profile, current situation, and sociocul- 
tural context. 
The VAPUS model asserts that ghost narra- 
tives possess an influential brand personality that 
parallels the strong consumer engagement with 
social media or the most popular commercial 
products or services (for related discussions, 
see Annett et al., 2016; Edwards, 2001). To 
clarify, brand personality is a concept in con- 
sumer marketing theory and practice that Aaker 
(1997) defined as, “the set of human character- 
istics associated with a brand” (p. 347). Accord- 
ingly, these narratives frequently foster emotional 
and rational engagement within individuals of 
diverse demographics. VAPUS is an acronym 
to describe the brand personality of ghost narra- 
tives via five characteristics (Hill et al., 2018, 
p. 119): 
• Versatility, in that narratives have flexibil- 
ity to represent a cross-section of moods, 
locations, or themes that span diverse 
literary genres. 
• Adaptability, in that narratives morph, at 
least in part, longitudinally in accordance 
with societal changes. 
• Participatory Nature, in that narratives invite 
interaction via individual or social activity 
and engagement, such as tours, clubs, private 
excursions, field research, and virtual activi- 
ties (TV, movies, books), etc. 
• Universality, in that narratives are interest- 
ing or relevant to diverse demographic po- 
pulations, including individuals spanning 
the paranormal belief-disbelief spectrum. 
• Scalability, in that narratives engage people 
individually and collectively, via meme-like 
“contagious” processes. 
 
Speaking to the validity of the VAPUS model, 
its components generally align to the independent 
work of Annett et al. (2016) who synthesized and 
deconstructed the experiential elements of 
ghostly experiences to identify four innovative 
ways to enhance design and engagement in con- 
sumer displays, that is, digital effects or function- 
ality with intensity, familiarity, tangibility, and 
shareability. Concomitant with this framework, 
occurrences are particularly important where spe- 
cific haunt-like characteristics reveal a predispo- 
sition in witnesses to perceive phenomena as 
 
 
more unusual, such as aberrant salience (i.e., the 
experience of ordinary events as remarkable and 
meaningful, see: Irwin, 2014; Irwin et al., 2014) 
or ambiguity intolerance (i.e., the tendency to 
perceive or interpret ambiguous situations as 
sources of threat, see: Houran & Williams, 1998; 
Lange & Houran, 2000). 
The VAPUS model underscores the inherent 
social reality and character of ghost narratives in 
their various forms. In fact, Drinkwater et al. 
(2019) asserted that “This model centrally defines 
spectral accounts as psychosocial constructions, 
which implies an intrinsic malleability via a range 
of related psychosocial influences” and that “ : : :  
many of the same characteristics that make ghost 
narratives so alluring and engaging also put them 
at risk for—if not actively promote—Trickster- 
type effects” (p. 160). Drinkwater et al.’s (2019) 
treatise on gaslighting effects in ghost narratives 
identified specific psychological and situational 
variables in these respects (pp. 155–159), and 
particularly factors related to influence, persua- 
sion, contagion, and conformity across different 
social settings. Accordingly, idiosyncrasies in 
symptom perception are expected to follow partly 
from the social dynamics and normative influ- 
ences operating at the time of the anomalous 
experiences (cf. Childs & Murray, 2010; Eaton, 
2019) or during occasions when experients doc- 
ument or socialize their experiences (cf. Boothby 
et al., 2014; Cooney et al., 2014). 
 
Percipient Meaning-Making in Ghostly 
Episodes and HP-S 
Drawing on systems theory and the idea of an 
interactionist (or enactive) phenomenon, we pro- 
pose that HP-S involves transliminal perceptions 
(the right people) that are structured due to atten- 
tional and perceptual mechanisms and facilitated 
by transliminality-conducive biopsychosocial en- 
vironments (the right settings), which often pro- 
duce a self-reinforcing loop (perceptual contagion) 
that is contextualized and reinforced by attribu- 
tions of external agency (belief in the paranormal) 
as a natural coping mechanism. That is, the con- 
fluence of sensory-somatic sensitivities, situa- 
tional context, and social milieu prompts certain 
individuals to grasp onto “ghosts” as the preferred 
explanation for perceived complexity (i.e., unre- 
solved ambiguities) in their biopsychosocial envi- 
ronment (cf. Lange et al., 2020; Lange & Houran, 
2001; O’Keeffe et al., 2019). The word or concept 
of “ghost” captures their experience, allows them 
to communicate it to others, and correspondingly 
turns the “unthought known” into a “thought 
known” (cf. Bollas, 1987). This view essentially 
equates ghostly episodes to the same fundamental 
mechanisms that stoke instances of mass (conta- 
gious) psychogenic illness, although with HP-S 
the flurries of perceptions are self-induced and 
self-sustained. 
Thus, our HP-S concept arguably recom- 
mends that clinicians or other authorities work- 
ing with percipients in their process of meaning- 
making or coping should take guidance from 
resources that address “unexpected or troubling” 
anomalous experiences using clinical, phenom- 
enological, or transpersonal frameworks (e.g., 
Drinkwater et al., 2013; Garety & Freeman, 
1999; Grof & Grof, 2017; Hastings, 1983; 
Isaac, 2017; Murray, 2012; Rabeyron & 
Loose, 2015). Our research findings would pre- 
dict that settings thatare most conducive for 
transliminality will correspondingly facilitate 
the most frequent or intense HP-S reports. Con- 
versely, the basic clinical take-away from this 
notion is that the frequency or intensity of 
ghostly episodes might be managed best by 
minimizing either (a) transliminality in the per- 
cipient or (b) variables that reinforce translimin- 
ality in the percipient’s social and physical 
environment. Known therapies should help to 
address these two goals. For example, research 
shows that delusional episodes in clinical pa- 
tients can be induced or heightened by manipu- 
lating or flooding their attention to ambiguous 
stimuli (Freeman et al., 2015). Contrariwise, the 
frequency or impact of certain anomalous ex- 
periences can sometimes be minimized with 
cognitive-behavioral techniques like attentional 
control (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Jalal, 2016) 
or leveling an individual’s tolerance of ambigu- 
ity (Haddock et al., 1998; Jacobs, 1980). 
More broadly, clinicians should also be pre- 
pared to assist percipients with the meaning- 
making of their anomalous experiences. Specif- 
ically, experiences such as hallucinations and 
delusions are often placed a continuum ranging 
from normal experience (Claridge, 1990; David, 
2010; Verdoux & van Os, 2002) to clinical 
psychotic conditions (Bentall & Morrison, 
2002). Participants who report anomalous ex- 
periences nevertheless consistently fall within 




of experiences involve temporary perceptual 
experiences (i.e., Fach et al., 2013; Laythe & 
Houran, 2019) that lack (a) more severe features 
and (b) a clear fit with the diagnostic criteria of a 
psychosis. 
From a cognitive perspective, a percipient’s 
appraisal mediates the outcome(s) of anomalous 
experiences. Hence, individuals typically regard 
anomalous experiences as psychotic symptoms 
only when they are deemed maladaptive. Accord- 
ingly, theorists regard certain appraisals—that 
is, externally-generated, uncontrollable, and 
personally-significant—as important develop- 
mental features of psychosis (Bentall et al., 
2001; Garety et al., 2001). 
Brett et al. (2014) noted that comparing indivi- 
duals from non-clinical populations who describe 
anomalous experiences equivalent to those re- 
ported by individuals with psychosis without 
adverse consequences for functioning and well- 
being, will enhance understanding of the cognitive 
appraisal process. Specifically, this approach en- 
ables the study of anomalies with both problematic 
andbenignoutcomes, whileprovidinginsightsinto 
the mediating effects of appraisal. In this context, 
Brett et al. (2014) recommended the Anomalous 
Experiences Interview (AANEX: Brett et al., 
2007) as a useful research instrument. Previous 
work with the AANEX compared three groups: 
(a) diagnosed with a psychotic condition, (b) “at 
risk” mental state, and (c) without a diagnosis or a 
“need-for-care.” 
From above, the undiagnosed (vs. the clinical 
groups) regarded their experiences as more pos- 
itive and benign, and subsequently were less 
likely to engage in avoidant or cognitive control 
strategies. Additionally, the undiagnosed group 
employed “normalizing” and “psychological” 
appraisals and were less likely to judge experi- 
ences using personal appraisals (i.e., less likely 
to attribute experiences to other people) (Brett 
et al., 2007). Studies that classified groups via 
diagnostic or clinical status have reported similar 
findings with respect to clinical and healthy popu- 
lations and anomalous experiences (Gaynor et al., 
2013; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). Of course, a 
limitation of using diagnostic or clinical status as a 
defining outcome of anomalous experiences is that 
clinical service involvement is influenced by in- 
dividual’s preferences, personality, and access to 
clinical treatment, for example, help-seeking be- 
havior, service access, and availability of alterna- 
tive support (Singh & Grange, 2006). 
The concept of “distress” likewise features 
prominently in cognitive approaches to psycho- 
sis. Thus, distress is considered both a defining 
feature of clinical psychological problems and the 
principal treatment target (Chadwick et al., 
1996). This view is consistent with research link- 
ing emotion and psychosis (e.g., Birchwood & 
Trower, 2006; Freeman & Garety, 2003). Psycho- 
logical issues related to emotional disturbance 
(e.g., depression and anxiety) are strong predictors 
of transition to psychosis in high-risk populations, 
and relapse in psychosis populations (Owens 
et al., 2005). 
Noting these factors, Brett et al. (2014) com- 
pared three groups: (a) Diagnosed, (b) meeting 
criteria for an At Risk Mental State, and (c) 
Undiagnosed (reported anomalous experiences, 
but who had never received diagnoses or been in 
need of clinical interventions for their psychotic 
experiences). Measures of anomalous experi- 
ences, emotional response (including distress), 
appraisal type, and psychological and contex- 
tual factors were completed for each participant. 
Analyses revealed that anomalous states char- 
acterized by changes in awareness and cognitive 
functioning, appraisals of experiences as caused 
by “other people,” and greater attempted control 
over anomalous experiences were predictors of 
higher distress. Spiritual appraisals, greater per- 
ceived social support/understanding, higher 
perceived controllability, and reacting with a 
neutral response predicted lower distress. Col- 
lectively these findings are consistent with the 
continuum model of psychosis and indicate that 
distress can be reduced by normalizing and 
validating contexts in which anomalous experi- 
ences are accepted, understood, and shared. 
These   observations   agree   with   those   of 
Drinkwater et al. (2013), who explored how 
people attach meaning to, and make sense of, 
anomalous experiences. Interpretative Phenome- 
nological Analysis (IPA) identified three master 
(major) themes: (a) distortion of reality (i.e., 
physical and mental fantasy of experience), (b) 
you are not alone (i.e., third party sensory pres- 
ence), and (c) personal growth (i.e., effect on the 
self). Close examination of these themes shows 
that they resonate closely with the predictive 
factors identified by Brett et al. (2014). For 
instance, distortion of reality included the sense 
that anomalous experiences were defined by their 
unusualness and the fact that they sat outside of 
socially-accepted norms, which Brett et al. (2014) 
 
 
predicts can lead to higher levels of distress. 
Hence, distortions were challenging because 
they tested notions of reality and were accompa- 
nied by altered awareness or odd cognitions and 
perceptions. 
In this context, negative appraisal stems from 
lack of control and produces disorientation and 
self-doubt. This was also evident within the 
theme “you are not alone,” where the sensed 
presence of a mysterious entity was associated 
with self-perceived powerlessness, subse- 
quently manifesting as the experiencer viewing 
themselves as passive and lacking control and 
further generating distress. In terms of personal 
growth, negative attributions were accompanied 
by undesirable feelings and emotions. Taken 
together, these themes and their contents onto- 
logically contribute to feelings of distress unless 
the experience is normalized in terms of the 
individual’s life and cultural history. Central 
to this process is the capacity to also explain 
the anomalous experience from the perspective 
of society. Notably, recent work by Sersch 
(2019) proffered a persuasive cross-cultural 
case that exorcism with those who believe 
they are possessed has been found to be as 
effective, if not better than clinical treatment if 
the exorcism is embodied in a accepting cultural 
milieu. Although possession holds its own 
empirical difficulties from more mundane anom- 
alous experiences, again the theme of cultural 
acceptance and perceived control appear to be 
mediating factors of distress relief. 
Drinkwater et al. (2013) also found that sub- 
jective paranormal experiences can serve positive 
functions such as fostering understanding and 
comfort. This was evident when they provided 
a sense of a deceased loved one. Here, positive 
appraisals ostensibly nurtured personal develop- 
ment and growth. Drinkwater et al. (2017) con- 
ducted further research using thematic analysis 
(TA). This study identified emergent themes from 
interviews of individuals describing paranormal 
experiences. Thus, Drinkwater et al. (2017) 
emphasized the modeling or patterning of “mean- 
ing” across percipients (cf. Braun & Clarke, 2006; 
Smith et al., 2009). These identified anomalous 
themes corresponded closely with the person- 
centered experiences in Drinkwater et al. 
(2013). This observation indicates that “attribu- 
tions” (appraisals) of “paranormal” (anomalous) 
experiences play an integral role in their assimi- 
lation and interpretation. This process is vital 
either to the rationalizing or pathologizing of 
experiences. In turn, rationalizing or pathologiz- 
ing determines the affective nature and poten- 
tially negative impact of anomalous experiences. 
 
Further Clinical Considerations 
With the Syndrome Model 
Beyond the general recommendations and dis- 
cussion above, we should highlight and discuss 
five key points based on our cumulative insights 
and learnings from our research program. First, 
emerging research suggests there is a continuum 
of “encounter proneness” that is grounded in 
transliminality (or permeable mental bound- 
aries). Thus, haunt-type experiences and those 
who report them are not randomly distributed. 
We accordingly propose that clinicians approach 
these occurrences as transliminal perceptions, 
and in extreme cases, perhaps as transliminal 
“dramas” (cf. Houran, 2013; O’Keeffe et al., 
2019). However, this does not mean that 
expressions of HP-S are inherently or entirely 
“negative” or unpleasant in their content or inter- 
pretation. Rather than restrict transliminality to a 
diathesis-stress perspective, this perceptual-per- 
sonality variable might be better viewed within 
the framework of differential susceptibility, that 
is, a predisposition toward worse outcomes in 
adverse contexts and better outcomes in positive 
or supportive contexts (Belsky & Pluess, 2009; 
Evans et al., 2019; Thalbourne & Houran, 
2005). 
This extends the developmental perspective 
of a loose mental boundary structure, which 
suggests that the impact of high levels may be 
affected by early childhood experiences (Aron & 
Aron, 1997; Thalbourne et al., 2003). Relatedly, 
people with high sensory processing sensitivity 
have been profiled as “Orchids,” “flourishing” 
when raised in healthy and supportive environ- 
ments, but likewise more vulnerable to the 
effects of inadequate care (i.e., “Dandelions”) 
(Greven et al., 2019, Lionetti et al., 2018). This 
view parallels McCreery and Claridge’s (1995, 
p. 142) idea of “happy transliminals,” or people 
who are functional despite, or perhaps even in 
part because of, their “anomalous experiences.” 
Second, the HP-S concept implies that 
encounter-prone people recurrently experience 
a diverse set of S/O symptoms. This undermines 




(or have perceived) a single anomaly, such as 
“sensing a presence,” “hearing a physical knock- 
ing,” or “seeing a ghost.” Probing for details 
should reveal an array of perceptions that have 
been experienced over time by encounter-prone 
individuals. Here, the Survey of Strange Events 
(SSE : Houran et al., 2019b) can be used as an 
inventory to assess the full range of anomalous 
experiences associated with specific percipients. 
As we discuss next, this information can help 
clinicians or researchers to understand why cer- 
tain people interpret or cope with these percep- 
tions as they do. We should stress that our 
proposed HP-S phenomenon occurs at a much 
larger rate than any of the DSM-V diagnoses 
involving psychosis. As such, care should be 
taken with reports of ghostly episodes so as not 
to misdiagnosis clients. Unlike psychotic dis- 
orders, ghostly episodes (and sometimes fantas- 
tical events) are absent of either positive or 
negative symptomology of schizophrenia, and 
more broadly, absent of the altered thinking 
states seen with psychotic episodes. 
Third, we suspect that threat (agency) detec- 
tion (e.g., Ben-Zeev et al., 2011; Brett et al., 
2014; Freeman et al., 2002; Jelic´ & Fich, 2018; 
McAndrew, 2020) influences the expression or 
report of HP-S in several ways. For starters, 
anomalies might be judged as more or less 
frightening depending on their degree of spon- 
taneity. Increasingly anxious or fearful reac- 
tions are likely when anomalous perceptions 
occur unexpectedly. An accompanying decline 
in overall mental health might also occur with 
individuals who have a strong “need for con- 
trol” (cf. Langer & Rodin, 1976; Leotti et al., 
2010). Next, there is the degree to which perci- 
pients interpret specific S/O anomalies as inher- 
ently threatening due to their nature, e.g., the 
more physical the events, the more dangerous 
they might seem. Lastly, we expect that the 
more proximal S/O anomalies are to a percipi- 
ent’s personal space, the more intense or preva- 
lent the corresponding interpretations of threat 
or persecution. 
That said, HP-S would seem to foster comfort 
or even enchantment when its interpretation is 
grounded in terms or beliefs that are non-threat- 
ening to one’s personal space. These could 
include pleasant notions of angels, mystical 
forces, shamanic power animals, or deceased 
loved ones (Houran, 2000). There is substantial 
clinical relevance in this point, as the process 
of making-meaning can lead percipients to inter- 
pretations that make sense of ghostly 
episodes, but as a consequence may exacerbate 
blame, fear, or proposed judgment of other- 
worldly forces in the eyes of clients. From 
the authors’ experience, individuals can 
develop exaggerated psychosomatic symptoms, 
or strong degrees of hypervigilance due to be- 
liefs that a “haunting” is somehow their fault or 
punishment. This can be particularly true if a 
client has existing mental health conditions that 
can be misattributed to the haunt experience. As 
one can see, the contribution to anxiety or 
depressive symptomology from these percep- 
tions could complicate an individual’s mental 
health and well-being. 
Fourth, anomalies that characterize HP-S 
apparently can occur spontaneously, not just 
when purposely facilitated. This is important to 
note, as many authors have explained these 
experiences largely in terms of suggestion- 
expectancy effects (French et al., 2009; Lange & 
Houran, 1997), demand characteristics, as well as 
fantasy proneness or overactive imaginations 
(Nickell, 2001). In other words, haunt-type ex- 
periences are often associated with some sort of 
“priming” (Harte, 2000; Houran, 2000)—as illus- 
trated by structured group events like spiritual-type 
practices (Laythe et al., 2017) or paranormal tour- 
ism (Houran et al., 2020). We acknowledge the 
explanatory power of anomalistic psychology, but 
there are also instances whereby the source(s) of 
some S/O anomalies (or perhaps the priming) is not 
entirely clear and requires more scrutiny (see e.g., 
Laythe & Houran, 2019; Laythe & Owen, 2012). 
Moreover, ostensibly spontaneous occurrences of 
HP-S show important differences in their phenom- 
enology compared to experiences that involve 
conditions of overt priming or imagination 
(Houran et al., 2019b). 
Fifth and finally, researchers and clinicians 
should keep in mind that anomalous experience 
involves two, potentially separate components: 
(a) mechanisms that produce anomalous percep- 
tions versus (b) those that dictate the interpreta- 
tion of these perceptions. Academia hasnot 
always made proper distinctions between these 
two aspects (David, 2010; Irwin et al., 2013; 
Lange, Ross et al., 2019; Wahbeh et al., 2020). 
Thus, the psychological set of experients helps to 
determine whether a similar set of S/O symptoms 
is interpreted as orthodox (e.g., an overactive 
imagination or chance events) or non-orthodox 
 
 
(e.g., paranormal agencies). There can even be 
nuances in non-orthodox attributions. 
Specifically, thesame S/O themesandcontents 
have been re-intepreted as various types of 
“entity encounters,” such as apparitions, angels, 
demons, gods, extra-terrestrials, elves, fairies, 
and Men in Black (Evans, 1987; Houran, 2000; 
Hufford, 1982). A purpor tedly new incarnation 
of the encounter experience seems aligned to the 
modern tech-era. Particularly, “spirits, spooks, 
and the supernatural” are seemingly de-empha- 
sized in favor of “satellites, surveillance, and 
stalking” in reports of so-called “group-(or 
gang) stalking” (Lange et al., 2020; O’Keeffe 
et al., 2019). Clearly from the above, an indivi- 
dual’s belief systems and ideology play critical 
roles in how S/O events are interpreted, as well as 




Qualitative and quantitative research strongly 
indicates that ghostly episodes represent a core 
“unidimensional construct” that can be described 
as a syndrome (Houran et al., 2019a, 2019b). 
However, clinicians and researchers should antic- 
ipate that its associated phenomenology (or 
symptom perception) can be shaped substantially 
by the psychological and social set of individuals. 
In other words, percipients are not passive wit- 
nesses to exclusively physical events. Rather, we 
contend that individuals showing HP-S are “in- 
tegrators” in the sense that they are active (albeit 
maybe unwitting) participants in the construction 
of their recurrent anomalous experiences. This 
conclusion agrees with general narrative theory 
that construes personal experiences as subjective 
and pliable constructions rather than objective 
and fixed representations of physical reality (for 
discussions, see: de Rivera & Sarbin, 1998; 
Oakley & Halligan, 2017). 
As a result, viewing ghostly episodes from the 
perspective of systems theory can reveal impor- 
tant insights, information, and context about ex- 
perients, including their: 
• Natural abilities related to somatic-sensory 
thresholds and the shifting and focusing of 
attention, i.e., a process of detection, per- 
ception, interpretation, and reaction. 
• Instinctive reactions to unexpected or unex- 
plained events (i.e., threat index). 
• Contextual variables that are part of the 
situation or clinical eco-system. 
• Existing beliefs and ideologies, or even 
challenges or disruptions to these. 
• Social norms and associated in-group and 
out-group dynamics. 
 
This interactionist (or enactive) view implies 
that ghostly episodes involve at least two distinct 
but related processes: (a) Percipient sensitivity, or 
“the right people in the right environments (or 
conditions)” (Laythe et al., 2018; Ventola et al., 
2019), and subsequently, (b) Percipient shaping, 
or the added influence of an individual’s psycho- 
logical and social set on the perceptual, atten- 
tional, or attributional processes that mediate or 
dictate the meaning given to anomalies that define 
our hypothesized syndrome model. The nuances 
in this characterization must now be explored 
empirically to identify the most effective inter- 
vention or coping strategies. 
Previous studies of symptom perception using 
Item Response Theory analytics (Houran & 
Lange, 2001a, 2009; Houran et al., 2019b) pro- 
vide a ready template for future research on the 
contributors to the macro- and micro-phenome- 
nology of ghostly episodes. This approach is made 
even easier with the advent of our SSE inventory 
(Houran et al., 2019b), a standardized (Rasch- 
scaled) measure of the psychological and physical 
events characteristically reported in haunt-type 
occurrences. This tool thus allows researchers 
the flexibility to study variables that influence 
the overall intensity levels of percipients’ accounts 
and potential nuances in the perception of discrete 
S/O anomalies. 
For example, we anticipate that significant dif- 
ferences in total scores on the SSE or “item shifts” 
within Houran et al.’s (2019b) Rasch hierarchy of 
discrete S/O perceptions will follow from (a) 
Belief in the Paranormal, (b) Religious Ideology, 
(c) Ideological Practice, (d) Social Desirability, (e) 
Latency, and (f) Environmental Setting. On this 
point, research designs are needed to explore 
whether narrative formation in HP-S follows a 
linear process that adheres to a predictable set of 
functions, e.g., Detection → Attribution (Interpre- 
tation) → Reaction → Report → Recall (for related 
discussions, see Drinkwater et al., 2019; Eaton, 
2019). Alternatively, some researchers have found 
nonlinear relationships among the components of 
meaning-making in anomalous experiences (e.g., 




Clearly, much work is needed to explore and 
describe the conventional elements and complex- 
ities that envelope ghostly episodes, and how the 
mechanisms underpinning these anomalous ex- 
periences dovetail with other findings in con- 
sciousness studies and religio-cultural research. 
We argue that such efforts should take precedence 
over approaches which assume parapsychological 
agencies definitely are operating in these cases. 
Based on the research reviewed here from estab- 
lished social, psychological, neurological, and envi- 
ronmental premises, we cannot emphasize enough 
that the “factual nature” of ghostly occurrences is 
not, “in fact” very relevant. The empirical evidence 
is reasonably clear that haunt-type experiences are 
significantly shaped by environment, culture, psy- 
chology, and the inherent interpretational biases 
that come with a systemic perspective. 
When we dispassionately consider the com- 
monality of these experiences in conjunction with 
what seems very likely to be an interactionist 
phenomenon, we are left with an event or experi- 
ence that is deemed real and meaningful by those 
who interpret it as such. Some consider testimo- 
nial evidence sufficient to attribute paranormal 
agency to some experiences; others would dis- 
agree. However, research has plainly shown that 
the root ontological stimulus of the HP-S process 
is not only interactive, but also interpretational, 
having demonstrated effects on the individual and 
society in terms of beliefs, values, and ideological 
reinforcement. Thus, whether materialism or pos- 
itivism deems paranormal agencies as “scientific” 
or not, it does not change the attributional, psy- 
chological, and social processes that are inter- 
twined within the core stimulus of a “ghostly 
episode.” This situation is not unique to these 
experiences, as belief- and behavior-based mod- 
els have been actively used in politics, science, 
marketing, business, and education. 
Witnesses to anomalies that define HP-S 
have been well-documented over the past 
100 years. The exact cause(s) for these reports 
remain unclear or untested in many instances. 
Regardless of what any individual or ideology 
believes to be “true,” cases of ghostly episodes 
are available for scientific analysis and clinical 
exploration. Science, without violating its prin- 
ciples, is meant to be used as a method, and 
inherent to its principles and practice is the 
necessity to revise our appraisals based on evi- 
dence. Accordingly, comprehensive models and 
methods are needed to examine and understand 
the interplay among the environment, psychol- 
ogy, and culture of these percipients. 
In the interim, we deem it wiser to conduct 
more studies and identify reliable models that will 
help us to understand these experiences, which 
are prevalent in our society and germane to 
spirituality in clinical practice. Perhaps with 
time, the forest of culture and psychology that 
surrounds the “family tree” of ghostly experi- 
ences will give us clues that speak to the broader 
question of consciousness itself. Or perhaps not. 
Regardless, a comprehensive framework that 
clinicians can use to conceptualize and contextu- 
alize the phenomenology of ghostly episodes is 
likely to help those who have experienced them, 
and perhaps further our knowledge of these 
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